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Abstract
he accountability of members of the board of directors of publicly traded companies has 
increased over years. Corresponding to these developments, there has been an inadequate 
advancement of tools and frameworks to help directorial functioning. his paper provides 
an argument for design of the Balanced Scorecard and Strategy Maps made available to the 
directors as a means of inluencing, monitoring, controlling and assisting managerial action. 
his paper examines how the Balanced Scorecard and Strategy Maps could be modiied and 
used for this purpose. he paper suggests incorporating Balanced Scorecards in the Internal 
Process perspective, ‘internal’ implying here not just ‘internal to the irm’, but also ‘internal 
to the inter-organizational system’. We recommend that other such factors be introduced 
separately under a new ‘perspective’ depending upon what the board wants to emphasize 
without creating any unwieldy proliferation of measures.
Tracking the Strategy Map over time by the board of directors is a way for the board to 
take responsibility for the irm’s performance. he paper makes a distinction between action 
variables and monitoring variables. Monitoring variables are further divided on the basis of 
two considerations: a) whether results have been met or not and b) whether causative factors 
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have met the expected levels of performance or not. Based on directorial responsibilities and 
accountability, we take another look at how the variables could be speciied more completely 
and accurately with directorial recommendations for executives.
Keywords: board of directors, directorial accountability, business judgement rule, strategy 
maps, balanced scorecards.
Valdymo įrankiai valdybos nariams:
strateginių žemėlapių ir subalansuotos apskaitos pritaikymas  
vadovybės veiklai
Anotacija
Įmonių, kurių akcijomis prekiaujama viešai, valdybos narių atskaitomybė laikui bėgant 
išaugo. Atsižvelgiant į šiuos pokyčius buvo sukurta daugybė priemonių ir sistemų, skirtų 
vadovams jų veiksmuose talkinti. Šiame straipsnyje pateikiami argumentuoti siūlymai va-
dovų veikloje pritaikyti ir panaudoti subalansuotą apskaitą ir strateginius žemėlapius, kurie 
galėtų tapti tinkamais įrankiais stebint, kontroliuojant ir remiant vadovų veiksmus. Autorius 
siūlo įtraukti subalansuotą apskaitą į vidinių procesų valdymo sritį („vidinis“ reiškia ne tik 
„vykstantis įmonės viduje“, bet ir „vykstantis tarporganizacinės sistemos viduje“). Patariama 
kitus panašius veiksnius įtraukti atskirai į naują sritį atsižvelgiant į valdybos prioritetus, net 
ir nesukuriant daugybės sunkiai valdomų priemonių.
Nuoseklus strateginių žemėlapių pildymas suteikia valdybai galimybę prisiimti atsako-
mybę už įmonės veiklos rezultatus. Straipsnyje skiriami veiksmo ir stebėjimo kintamieji. Ste-
bėjimo kintamieji toliau skirstomi atsižvelgiant į šias sąlygas: a) ar buvo pasiekti planuojami 
rezultatai ir b) ar priežastiniai veiksniai atitiko planuojamus veiklos rezultatus. Atsižvelgda-
mas į vadovų atsakomybę ir atskaitomybę autorius iš naujo analizuoja, kokiu būdu galima 
būtų išsamiau ir tiksliau apibrėžti kintamuosius, kad tai atsispindėtų vadovų rekomendaci-
jose dėl vykdančiojo personalo veiksmų.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: valdyba, vadovų atskaitomybė, verslo sprendimų priėmimo taisy-
klė, strateginiai žemėlapiai, subalansuota apskaita.
Introduction
Over the past several years, the world over there has seen several bankruptcies 
and huge investor losses attributed to frauds and misadventures by corporate 
executives and incompetent boards. he governance failures of companies 
have resulted in calls to make the boards more accountable. here is also a call 
for professionalization of the board (Pozen, 2010). Indeed, there may be mul-
tiple ways to respond to these challenges. his paper takes the view that board 
directors (BoD) have to:
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a) engage the executive from a more informed position and
b) undertake a better self-management by the board.
In general, the response to governance failures has been one of outrage and 
exasperation at the ‘ethical lows’ the corporate world has sunken into! Our 
purpose of this paper is neither to dwell on them nor to report of such com-
mentaries. We want to point out and help those of integrity to be more engaged 
and efective while performing the directorial function.
With higher expectations from the board, courts too have been changing 
in their view of directorial responsibilities. Clarke (2007) writes of how things 
have been changing in the US, or more particularly in Delaware, where a large 
number of irms are registered. In respect of what has been happening until 
now, he writes that ‘as long as there is no evidence of fraud, gross negligence or 
other misconduct, directors will not be held responsible for a business judge-
ment... In Delaware directors are presumed to have acted on an informed ba-
sis, in good faith and with no personal interest in the matter [...]’. However, 
lately things are becoming diferent. ‘Recently however, Delaware courts have 
focused on instances of violations of directors’ duty of care so egregious 
that they rise to the level of bad faith, a serious matter as directors cannot 
be indemniﬁed from liabilities arising out of breaches of good faith’ (Clarke, 
2007, p. 37).
In the US, the rules themselves come in for a major overhaul through the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, more popularly known as the SOX (Congress of 
the United States of America, 2002), which was intended to prevent executives 
from committing fraudulent acts and misleading shareholders and the pub-
lic by manipulating information and by making false public announcements. 
To mitigate or check unethical behavior and increase transparency, the SOX 
subjected listed companies to tightened rules and regulations and to penalties 
for managerial misconduct. he SOX has had some impact on corporate go-
vernance, even if there have been failure of several SOX-compliant companies 
in the recent past. his is creating further pressure on the BoD and directors 
in terms of a greater accountability (Pozen, 2010) and reinterpretation of the 
business judgement rule more stringently.
Outside the US, this has been the case too. For instance, Riordan (2004) re-
ports of the High Court in Ireland restricting the activities of four non-execu-
tive directors of a irm, Tralee Beef 	 Lamb Ltd., then in liquidation, ‘on the ba-
sis that they had acted honestly but not responsibly in relation to the conduct 
of the afairs of the company.’ he court found that the directors, one of them 
appointed by one of the irm’s long-term sponsor, had failed to adequately keep 
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themselves abreast of the company’s afairs through such means as attending 
the company’s meetings, raising issues with the irm when BoD meetings were 
not scheduled, making contacts with co-directors in discharging the duties 
and obligations as non-executive directors and supervising and controlling the 
executives in managing the afairs of the irm prudently. We see that acts of 
commission are not necessary conditions for courts to pronounce adversarial 
judgments on the irm’s directors, whether executive or non-executive. Acts 
of omission (in this case, acting passively or not acting) too, according to the 
court, are violations.
he fact that acts of omission and the ‘honest but not responsible’ clause are 
increasingly oten putting pressure even on directors with good intensions is 
a foregone conclusion. Ironically, even the insurance that directors could pos-
sibly take provides an adequate cover only for alleged wilful acts. Covers such 
as ‘Directors and Oicers Insurance’, which are designed to safeguard the inte-
rests of directors and managers of the irm against dereliction of duties, do not 
usually cover honest-but-not-responsible situations (hrope, 2010). In other 
words, there is no substitute for directors to actively partake in the activities of 
the board of the irm and keep themselves fully informed of what the executive 
side is doing. Otherwise, they expose themselves and their reputations to a risk 
that did not exist until recently. Under these circumstances, it is noteworthy 
that there are no tools and techniques available for the directors that would 
help them deal with the changed reality.
Based on our experience with boards, we suggest that directors should be 
provided with high-level conceptual information on ‘the logic of the irm’, per-
formance indicators and performance, so that the board is able to understand 
the workings of the irm and the results generated and, consequently, advise 
the executive oicers in a more efective and timely manner. Currently, there 
appears to be an emphasis on the executive tabling performance targets, actual 
performance, trends and key actions anticipated to be taken by the executive. 
While this is certainly required, this is inadequate. What is important is also 
for the board to have an occasional peep into the meta-logic of the irm and 
be informed of performance drivers, where they stand and how they are in-
terlinked to inluence the inal performance. In this paper we suggest how the 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC) and Strategy Maps could be tailored to make availa-
ble to the directors a means of inluencing, monitoring, controlling and assist-
ing managerial action. he paper suggests incorporating BSCs in the Internal 
Process perspective (to use terms used in the Balanced Scorecard literature), 
‘internal’ implying here not just ‘internal to the irm’, but also ‘internal to the 
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inter-organizational system’. We recommend that other such factors be intro-
duced separately under a new ‘perspective’ depending upon what the board 
wants to emphasize without creating unwieldy proliferation of measures.
Tracking the Strategy Map by directors is a way for the board to take re-
sponsibility for the irm’s performance. We suggest that performance variables 
be divided into action variables and monitoring variables. We also suggest that 
the monitoring variables be further divided on the basis of two considerations: 
a) whether results have been met or not and b) whether causative factors have 
met the expected levels of performance or not. We relook at how the variables 
could be speciied more completely and accurately with directorial recom-
mendations for the executive element. We show how adoption of the Balanced 
Scorecard and Strategy Maps not only enhances the ability of the board to be 
more informed and direct managerial action, but also promote ‘self-manage-
ment’ of the board. his is particularly relevant in the context of a diverse set 
of skills and backgrounds that board members are currently expected to have. 
his paper is an attempt to live up to the times and provide the directors with a 
means to be more efective in a collective manner, while remaining independ-
ent in their individual judgements.
1. Implications of contemporary directors
Implications of contemporary directors:
a) he role of the director is more than advisory.
b) he position of the director comes with certain risks that did not exist 
until recently.
c) Being a friend of the chairperson of co-directors is an insuicient rea-
son for being on the board.
d) It is not possible to be a member of too many boards. In fact it would 
be rather against one’s reputation to be in too many boards. here are 
human limitations on what one person can possibly do.
e) It is important to jell with other members of the board and create a 
professional yet collegial group working together for clarifying, unders-
tanding and achieving the vision of the company.
What these mean is that the board has to team up with the executive and 
create better results for stakeholders. According to Pozen (2010), this would 
require a compact board, with directors having the right experience in the 
industry that allows them to counsel the executive side, and spending more 
time for board afairs. It will also require that the board manages itself in more 
thorough ways using appropriate tools.
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2. Lack of tools in measuring board performance
Epstein and Roy (2004b), Kiel and Nicholson (2005), Minichilli et al. (2007) 
through their studies have identiied the potential beneits of board evaluations. 
Internationally, initiatives by security regulators have placed requirements on 
boards to undertake annual performance evaluation (Long, 2006). Evidence 
from such countries as the USA suggests the majority of boards fail to un-
dertake any form of regular performance evaluation (Conger et al., 1998; 
Epstein and Roy, 2004b). Further, where board performance evaluation is 
carried out, its form and rigour can vary considerably (Leblanc, 2007; 
Roy, 2008; Spencer, 2009). Consequently, it has been suggested that inade-
quate board performance evaluation practices present a signiicant barrier 
to improving governance and accountability (Collier, 2004; Epstein and Roy, 
2004a & 2004b; Minichilli et  al., 2007). Internationally, there is a room for 
improvement in how board performance is evaluated. As a basis for con-
sidering potential improvements, we now relect on the key theoretical per-
spectives of performance measurement and the argument for considering 
performance from the stakeholder perspective.
3. heoretical perspectives on performance measurement:  
shareholder v. stakeholder
heoretical perspectives on performance measurement can be broadly catego-
rized into shareholder perspectives and stakeholder perspectives (Fitzgerald, 
2007, p. 223). he former view is based on the belief that inancial measures 
provide the most relevant and direct focus for improving performance, 
since measuring and rewarding activities that improve financial per-
formance is thought to be the best means of enhancing shareholder wealth. 
his perspective is usually associated with the use of a single inancial met-
ric as the focus of performance measurement (Fitzgerald, 2007, p. 229). Typi-
cal inancial metrics employed within this perspective include Shareholder 
Value Added (SVA) and Economic Value Added (EVA) (Starovic et al., 2004).
However, an alternative stakeholder perspective has reshaped thinking 
about performance measurement. The stakeholder perspective ‘argues 
that companies compete on many dimensions whose evaluation cannot be 
conined to narrow inancial indicators’ (Fitzgerald, 2007, p. 224). Typically, 
performance measurement frameworks underpinned by the stakeholder 
theory incorporate multiple measures, both inancial and non-inancial. While 
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recognizing that inancial outcomes are important for shareholders, the non-
inancial measures are designed to relect the strategic importance of focusing 
on other stakeholders, such as suppliers, employees and customers. Well-
known examples of stakeholder-based performance measurement frameworks 
include the SMART pyramid (Lynch and Cross, 1991), the performance prism 
(Neely and Adams, 2001) and balanced scorecards (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). 
he most well-known of these – the balanced scorecard – forms the focus of 
this paper. Its potential application to board performance measurement is 
discussed below.
4. Strategy maps and BSCs for boards
A potentially fruitful approach to board performance measurement, champi-
oned by Epstein and Roy (2004a), is Kaplan and Norton’s (1992) balanced score-
cards. his framework provides a means of representing the multiple goals of 
boards and the multiple drivers of board efectiveness in achieving those goals.
Epstein and Roy (2004a) draw on Kaplan and Norton’s balanced scorecard 
(BSC) model (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996, 2001, 2008) to propose a frame-
work for measuring and improving board performance. hey note that ‘by us-
ing a balanced scorecards developed speciically for evaluating and improv-
ing their performance, boards should be able to identify and understand the 
cause-and-efect relationships of their actions on shareholder value, thus focus-
ing attention on the drivers of corporate success and the levers they can pull to 
improve their performance and the company’s performance’ (Epstein and Roy, 
2004a, p. 26).
he cause-and-efect aspect of any BSC design is important in ensuring its 
potential as a strategic management tool as well as a measurement frame-
work (Kaplan and Norton, 2001), but the challenges of conirming BSC cau-
sality are well-noted (Brignall, 2002; Nprreklit, 2000; Nprreklit et al., 2007; 
Davis and Albright, 2004; Bukh and Malmi, 2005; Malina et al., 2007). Bukh 
and Malmi (2005) point to Kaplan and Norton’s argument that performance 
measures should be derived from assumed cause-and-efect relationships, and 
note that these assumptions may inevitably be wrong. In other words, the BSC 
can only ever relect a strategy that is a set of hypotheses about causality, rather 
than a set of proven relationships. However, Bukh and Malmi (2005) also note 
that, ideally, organisations should attempt to validate their causality hypotheses 
when data becomes available (see also: Stemsrudhagen, 2004; Chenhall, 2009).
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Building assumed causality relationships into a board BSC requires iden-
tifying (i) the ‘leading’ indicators of performance in the areas equivalent to 
Kaplan and Norton’s learning and growth, internal processes and customer 
satisfaction dimensions, and (ii) the ‘lagging’ indicators related to inancial 
outcomes. Epstein and Roy (2004a) take this approach. hey follow the Kaplan 
and Norton BSC framework very closely, simply substituting stakeholders’ sat-
isfaction for the customer dimension, since stakeholders can be considered 
as ‘customers’ for board outcomes. Epstein and Roy’s inclusion of inancial 
measures (Economic Value Added (EVA), Return on Investment (ROI), 
share price, earnings, cash low, and proit in excess of plan) as lagging 
indicators rests on the assumption that good board structure and per-
formance will contribute to a strong inancial performance. Although ele-
ments of this assumption remain contested (Dalton et al., 1998; Conger et al., 
1998; Korac-Kakabadse et al., 2001; Bhagat and Black, 2002; Leblanc, 2007; Roy, 
2008), other studies have found evidence to support the assumption that 
good board performance translates to good corporate performance (e.g., 
MacAvoy and Millstein, 1999). This assumption is also justiiable on the 
basis that the boards which fail to lead their organisations towards targeted 
levels of inancial performance are unlikely to be considered efective in the 
long run. In the following sections, we will be discussing how to a) engage 
the executive from a more informed position, and b) ensure a better self-man-
agement by the board.
5. Engaging the executive from a more informed position
he BoD should look for ways to improve corporate governance by imple-
menting new tools that help companies translate strategic orientations into 
tangible goals. It has been shown that strategic management systems, such 
as the Balanced Scorecard, can help managers in articulating what the irm 
stands for and in developing objectives, goals, systems and metrics with a view 
to aligning strategy, actions and performance. he same system could be crea-
tively extended to help the board engage the executive.
Let us look at the role of the board. Citing previous research, Mallin (2010) 
identiies three objectives of the board. We add the fourth one based on Monks 
and Minow (2004):
a) Provide superior strategic guidance to ensure the company’s growth 
and prosperity;
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b) Ensure accountability of the company to its stakeholders, including share-
holders, employees, customers, suppliers, regulators, and the community;
c) Ensure that a highly qualiied executive team manages the company;
d) Provide advice and counseling to the CEO.
a) Provide superior strategic guidance to ensure the company’s growth  
and prosperity
While the board does not formulate the strategy of the irm, it needs to ap-
prove it and monitor whether the executive side of the irm has been able to 
meet the stated objectives. his requires more than a cursory understanding of 
the company (Mallin, 2010). he board needs to understand the product-mar-
ket niche which the company serves, competitive threats and opportunities, 
industry trends, the irm’s competencies and whether resource allocation and 
the processes that go behind it are sound. Nagel and Rigatuso (2003) report 
of McKinsey’s study that showed that 44% of directors were unclear about the 
drivers of value for the organizations where they held directorship. his could 
mean two things, either lack of understanding of the industry and the irm’s 
dynamics or inadequate time spent for the purpose. While the former is ad-
dressable only by a better selection of directors as suggested Pozen (2010), the 
latter can be addressed, at least partly, by having better tools for assessing the 
irm and being more engaged in the irm’s afairs. his is where strategy maps 
could come handy.
A strategy map shows what the objectives of the irm are, how they are to 
be achieved and the connection between the objectives of various sub-units 
(departments) and how these act together to produce overall results. For direc-
tors, the strategy map becomes a template not only to assess past successes and 
failures, but also to understand the ‘organizational logic’ that is employed for 
the future. he directors will be able to examine strategy maps and scorecards 
and understand the strategy-making process of the executive. he collective 
experience of the directors could be marshalled to creatively challenge the as-
sumptions inherent in the strategic maps that the executive has used. his will, 
if properly employed, be of great help for the irm.
b) Ensure accountability of the company to its stakeholders, including share-
holders, employees, customers, suppliers, regulators, and the community
It is the responsibility of directors to ensure that the interests of sharehold-
ers are taken into account. his is indeed a tricky issue. For the most part, 
the executive side is generally found to be singularly focused on a day-to-day 
management of the company and stakeholder management is considered to be 
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luxury. Short-term maximization of shareholder returns takes priority. If the 
members of the board could act as champions of diferent stakeholders while 
not losing sight of the realistic side of businesses, it would greatly help in buil-
ding a long-term value for the irm. It will be possible for the board to help shape 
scorecards in terms of representing stakeholder interest and representing these 
as speciic goals, followed by tracking and monitoring of the indicators.
c) Ensure that a highly qualiied executive team manages the company
he board can make a huge diference in the placement of the right persons 
in the right places. Even in the CEO’s selection, the boards may not be doing 
a proper job (Khurana, 2001). he board could have a say in overall talent 
management if only directors are knowledgeable and willing to make eforts. 
Surely, once the Chief Executive is selected it is important for him or her to 
have the freedom to place members of the team as he or she thinks it. Ater 
all, the Chief Executive has to function on a day-to-day basis. However, there 
is a role for the board to suggest changes in recruitment processes for senior 
executives, retention strategies, placement of advisors, succession planning 
etc.; in short, talent management. Strategy maps and scorecards can help the 
board to understand existing talent management policies and processes and 
the need for changes there.
d) Provide advice and counseling to the CEO
Finally, there is the need to provide advice and counseling to the CEO. he 
Western style of leadership in the professional corporate realm, especially in 
the US, has been very individualistic. his has created a larger-than-life image 
of the infallible Chief Executive Oicer, which will have to change if the board 
has to function efectively. here is the need to marshal the collective wisdom 
of the board to beneit the company. his requires a rethinking of the leader-
ship style professed until now in textbooks of management. A recent article in 
the Guardian sums up the prevailing leadership view in the West (which is also 
that of the corporate world elsewhere); provocative and self-explanatory, the 
article is entitled “Superheroes and super villains – why the cult of the CEO 
blinds us to reality” and claims that ‘the urge to identify company leaders per-
sonally with every corporate high and low is absurdly simplistic.’
6. Better self-management by the board
By self-management, we mean the management exercised by board members 
of themselves in a collective sense. his is indeed not easy. he board members 
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are successful individuals who have a perspective of their own, and to have any-
thing that ‘smells’ of harmony is not easy. And yet the strongly autonomous im-
pulses of the members have to be matched with the need for collective thinking 
and action. Most research into the factors that contribute to board efectiveness 
has focused on structural aspects of boards using mainly quantitative research 
methods. Over the past decade, however, there has been a move towards exami-
ning behaviour inside the boardroom using qualitative approaches (e.g., Higgs, 
2003; Edlin, 2007; Parker, 2007). In particular, researchers are increasingly con-
cerned about explaining the functioning of boards and building a theory based 
on the experiences of those who sit around the boardroom table (Corley, 2005; 
Roberts et al., 2005; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005; Edlin, 2007). his paper sits within 
this genre of research by examining the important issue of how board perform-
ance might be measured from the perspective of board members themselves.
Multiple factors have been identiied in relevant literature as contribut-
ing to board efectiveness. Several aspects of board structure and process 
are important. For example, diversity of gender, age and race; percentage 
of executive v. non-executive members; chair/CEO duality; board size; 
number of meetings; information availability; and board member equity 
ownership (e.g., Jensen, 1993; Milliken and Martins, 1996). Furthermore, re-
search in the UK and the Commonwealth countries – where the roles of 
the chair and the CEO are usually separated – has revealed more about the 
individual impact of the chair and the CEO on board efectiveness (Cadbury, 
1992; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1998; Leblanc, 2004; Dahl, 2005; Kakabadse 
and Kakabadse, 2007).
he ‘soter’ aspects of board practice are being increasingly oten identiied 
as perhaps more signiicant than structural elements (Van den Berghe and 
Levrau, 2004). In particular, the importance of the relationship between 
the chair and the CEO has been noted (e.g. Leblanc, 2004; Kakabadse 
et al., 2006), along with the inluences that the leadership skills of the chair, 
the effectiveness of individual directors, and effective working relation-
ships between management and the board have on overall board effective-
ness (Leblanc, 2004). The importance of board ‘culture’ is also recognized 
(Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004; Leblanc, 2007; Parker, 2007), though it 
is acknowledged to be one of the more subjective and challenging factors while 
measuring performance. A modiied Strategy Map (see Fig. 1) and BSC (see 
Table 1), based on Epstein and Roy’s study (2004a) for board evaluation, are 
presented below.
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Strategic 
Outcomes
Stakeholder
Perspective
Internal Business 
Processes
Learning and 
Growth Perspective
Strong relationships
High level of ethical 
behaviour and legal 
compliance
Successful 
identi	cation and 
management of various 
stakeholders
' 
needs
High level of corporate 
governance and 
accountability
Successful risk and crisis 
identi	cation and 
management
Improving board 
structure
Good boardroom 
practice
Eective chair leadership
Strategic clarity
Strong succession for 
CEO and senior 
management
Financial 
Perspective
Company 	nancial 
performance
Fig. 1. Modiied strategy map for board of directors
(source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Epstein and Roy, 2004a)
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Board’s objectives Key performance measures
Financial Perspective
Company inancial performance • Economic Value Added
• Return on Investment
• Share price
 Strategic outcomes
Strong relationships • Rating of board-management relationships
• Rating of internal board relationships
• Rating of stakeholder relationships
Strategic clarity • Rating of the board’s understanding of strategic aims  
and directions
• Rating of directors’ involvement in strategy % of accepted  
projects that meet/exceed expectations
Stakeholders
High level of ethical behavior and 
legal compliance
• Number of ethical/legal violations
• Level of compliance with governance guidelines
High level of corporate governance 
and accountability
• Number of voluntary disclosures
• Evaluation of quality of external disclosures by  
stakeholders or by experts
Successful identiication and 
management of various stakeholders’ 
needs
• Number of meetings with stakeholders
• Number of complaints (employees, community, customer)
• Existence of communication channels with board
Internal Processes
Successful risk and crisis identiication 
and management
• Number of risk audits performed and their results
• Number of crises and evaluation of response
Efective chair leadership • Rating of Board-CEO relationships
• Rating of chair’s ability to steer the board towards a  
strategic focus and away from day-to-day management
Good boardroom practice • Ratings of quality of debate
• Rating of the quality of questions asked of the CEO
• Ratings of inter-board relationships (positive and  
constructive v. negative and/or constraining)
• Rating of directors’ conduct (positive and constructive v.  
negative or undermining)
Learning and Growth
Strong succession for CEO and senior 
management
• Existence of a position description for CEO
• Interim CEO identiied
Improving board structure • Diversity of the board (backgrounds, experience and skills)
• Number and quality of skills-development opportunities  
available to board members
• Board selection processes regularly reviewed
Table 1. Proposed balanced scorecards for measuring board conduct
(source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Epstein and Roy, 2004a)
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Conclusions
In this paper, we have argued that, on account of the recent governance break-
down in several companies, there is a signiicant trend towards directors of 
irms being asked to oversee irms more closely than ever before. he directors’ 
iduciary responsibilities are being extended to newer areas. Accordingly, the 
risks they are exposed to are also on the rise. Courts have recently started to in-
terpret corporate laws more stringently. Until recently, the business judgement 
rule ensured that board directors were not considered to be in violation with 
respect to acts of omission. For instance, they were subject to punishment for 
not attending meetings regularly or not being suiciently informed of what is 
happening in their companies. his may be changing. Acts of omission or the 
‘honest but not-responsible’ clause can no longer be ignored by directors. Such 
covers as ‘Directors and Oicers Insurance’ usually provide protection only 
against alleged wilful acts. hey do not cover ‘honest but not responsible’ situ-
ations. he implications are serious, and directors are increasingly vulnerable. 
To handle this, the directors require new tools for supervision of executive 
performance and self-management of boards.
Balanced scorecards and strategy maps have gained enormous popula-
rity in the last several years. Traditionally they have been used for ensuring 
proper it between the irm’s strategy and the environment of the company, 
stakeholder orientation, aligning executive action in functional areas with the 
irm’s strategy, balancing short-term actions with the long-term aspirations 
of the irm, creating a measurement system that provides for overall superior 
performance. We have shown in this paper that the same tools could be appro-
priately modiied and used by the board. On the one hand, the board members 
will beneit by having a holistic picture of how the performance measures and 
the irm’s scores on these measures are related to each other in terms of cause-
efect (or leading and lagging) relationships. Having a better understanding 
of the logic of the irm better through strategy maps, the board will be able 
to advise the executive in a better and timely manner. Furthermore, by incor-
porating the board’s performance itself into the BSC scheme, it will be able 
to self-monitor its performance better. We have also pointed out some direc-
tions towards such modiication. Certainly, further work is required to make 
efective implementation, which will require academicians, consultants and 
enlightened corporate boards to come together and show the way.
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